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This thesis analyzes how well United States Special Forces (USSF) are employing 
Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) in accordance with the current Commander 
International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) guidance on counterinsurgency 
(COIN) contracting in Afghanistan.  By analyzing the current ways USSF are employing 
MAAWS, specifically in Southern Afghanistan, this thesis identifies friction areas (past, 
present, future) between guidance and employment at the Special Operation Task Force 
(SOTF) level and below.  Based on this analysis, this thesis provides recommendations to 
help reduce these friction areas and enable Special Forces tactical units to better employ 
Money as a Weapon System.  The main recommendations focus on incorporating the 
Yoder Three-Tier Model, modified to meet the needs of USSF and enhancing training on 
contingency contracting to educate SF Commanders and Soldiers designated to fill the 
role of contracting officer‘s representative (COR).  These recommendations will enable 
Special Forces to better employ MAAWS in the future and greatly increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their contracting procedures. 
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―Money is my most important ammunition in this war‖ 
–MG David Petraeus, 101st Airborne Division Air Assault 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS), published 
in April 2009 by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, is a handbook commanders can 
turn to for basic information on contingency contracting.  It identifies contingency 
contracting as a potential ―weapon system‖ that a commander can use to accomplish his 
mission.1  While warfighters receive training on most weapons systems they use, most 
receive little, if any, training on how to employ money as a weapon system prior to 
deployment.  Over the past decade, the United States has spent billions of dollars to fund 
the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Much of the money spent has gone to civilian 
contractors who perform many crucial roles.  In Southern Afghanistan, every military 
unit present relies on civilian contractors for numerous support functions.  At Kandahar 
Airfield, the second largest base in Afghanistan, the majority of all logistical operations 
for day-to-day life is handled by civilian contractors.  Food preparation, fuel handling, 
construction, sanitation, generator maintenance, and security are just a few examples of 
the hundreds of services contractors provide so the men and women in uniform can ―fight 
the war.‖ 
United States Special Forces units are no exception and they too could not 
function without contractor support.   The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how well 
United States Special Forces (USSF) are employing Money as a Weapon System 
(MAAWS) in accordance with the current Commander International Security Assistance 
Force (COMISAF) guidance on counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting in Afghanistan, 
and which areas can be improved.  Chapter I reports the current state of U.S. Army 
                                                 
1 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander’s Guide to Money As A Weapons System Handbook,  
Handbook No. 09–2  (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2009), 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09–27/09–27.pdf (accessed 8 November 2011). 
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contingency contracting.  Chapter II looks at the current guidance on COIN contracting.  
Chapter III addresses the current ways in which USSF are employing MAAWS.  Chapter 
IV identifies areas of friction between guidance and employment.  Finally, Chapter V 
recommends how these friction areas can be mitigated. 
The Army as a whole has implemented numerous changes to its guidance and 
policies on contingency contracting.  Many of these changes resulted from 
recommendations identified by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program 
Management in Expeditionary Operations and the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In September 2010, General Petraeus issued COMISAF‘s 
guidance on COIN Contracting.  One of the major themes of his guidance focuses on an 
‗Afghan first‘ initiative and a population–centric approach to employing Money as a 
Weapon System.   USSF has relied heavily on contracting to support its mission in 
Southern Afghanistan; in theory, this new guidance should enhance its mission, which 
has always focused highly on the Afghan population.  But before turning to USSF, it is 
first, important that we understand the current state of contingency contracting within the 
United States Army. 
B. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING  
The term contingency contracting was first used only a decade or two ago.  The 
practice however, can be dated back to 1775 when the United States military contracted 
logistical support for its military forces—to different degrees, in both domestic and 
overseas operations, with varying levels of success.  The practice of contracting logistics 
support for military operations often brought an expedition to ruins.  But, since World 
War II, contingency contracting has been an integral part of the military‘s operational 
capabilities, although problems still persist.2 
Reduced manpower and increased global positioning of military forces have 
increased demand for contractor support during contingencies.  For decades, the military 
has been contracting for goods and services, thus becoming a less self-sufficient 
                                                 
2 Carey Luse, Christopher Madeline, Landon Smith, and Stephen Starr, ―An Evaluation of 
Contingency Contracting: Past, Preset, and Future,‖ (Master‘s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 5. 
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organization. This means contractors are more often relied upon for supplies, services, 
and construction in contingency environments.3 Reports indicate there are more 
contractors on the battlefield than ever before; in 2010, State and Defense department 
figures show more than 260,000 contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan, a number 
at times, exceeding the total number of U.S. military personnel in theater.4   The United 
States military has found itself having to conduct contracting in contingency operations in 
order to provide essential support for time-sensitive operational objectives, to include the 
procurement and acquisition of supplies and services ranging from the simple to more 
complex and involving everything from interagency support to military construction. 
According to 10 U.S.C § 101(a)(13), the term contingency operation refers to a 
military operation that:  
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or 
against an opposing military force; or  
(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty members of 
the uniformed services under [other portions of this title] …or any other 
provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by 
the President or Congress.5 
The Defense Acquisition University‘s (DAU) Contingency Contracting course 
(CON234) defines Contingency Contracting as: ―Direct contracting support to tactical 
and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and MOOTW, both 
domestic and overseas.‖6  This definition is purposely broad to include many types of 
contingencies, such as: major theater wars, small scale contingencies, domestic and 
international disaster and/or emergency relief operations, and military operations other 
                                                 
3 David E. Hill, ―The Shaft of the Spear: U.S. Special Operations Command, Funding, Authority, and 
the Global War on Terrorism‖ (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
2006). 
4 Department of Defense, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,  
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,  Final Report to Congress,  (August 2011), 
2.  http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf (accessed 8 November 2011). 
5 General Military Law, U.S.C, Title 10, § 101(a)(13)  (1992). 
6 E. Cory Yoder, ―MN3318 - Contingency Contracting Basics‖ (presentation, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, July 12, 2011).  
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than war (MOOTW).  Basically, contingency contracting is the process by which 
essential supplies and services are obtained to support military forces. This can be during 
a declared war or during peacetime and can take place either in the Continental United 
States (CONUS) or outside the Continental United States (OCONUS.) 
A contingency environment can be classified as either mature or immature.  A 
mature environment characterized by a sophisticated infrastructure capable of supporting 
and sustaining operations for extensive periods of time.  It can have all or a combination 
of the following characteristics: legal framework, host-nation agreements, financial 
networks to support complex transactions, vigorous transportation systems, business 
capacity, capability, and a willingness to interact.7 A mature environment has 
mechanisms available, which support the capability to quickly adapt to changing 
requirements and priorities.  It often consists of vendors and suppliers who have prior 
contracting experience with the U.S. government and who can comply with Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements.  In contrast, an immature contracting 
environment is one lacking the support infrastructure described above. Immature 
environments may require ―work arounds‖ in order for forces/contractors to leverage 
capability and may require ―grooming‖ to bring the infrastructure up to desired 
operational standards.8 
While no two contingency contracting operations are exactly alike, they will fall 
into one or more of the four typical phases of a contingency: Phase I–Mobilization/Initial 
Deployment; Phase II–Buildup; Phase III–Sustainment; and/or Phase IV–
Termination/Redeployment.9 There is also a newly adopted ―Phase Zero‖ which deals 
with the planning, shaping, and exercising of a contingency operation.10  Depending on 
which phase a contingency operation is in will help CCOs determine their resources and 
help them prepare for the requirements needed to fulfill mission support.  It is important 
                                                 
7 Yoder, ―MN3318.‖ 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
10 E. Cory Yoder, Phase Zero Operations for Contingency and Expeditionary Contracting–Keys to 
Fully Integrating Contracting Into Operational Planning and Execution. Sponsored Research Report NPS-
CM-10–160, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
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to note that not all operations will follow the particular sequence detailed below; a 
location may be in a hybrid phase based on various factors—including, but not limited to, 
operational environment, mission adjustments and personnel surges.   
1. Phase I – Mobilization and Initial Deployment 
The mobilization and initial deployment phase of an operation, normally the first 
30–45 days, can be one of the most stressful and confusing environments a CCO will 
face. The need to award contracts quickly upon arrival is usually imperative to the 
mission. The main emphasis during this stage is on basic life-support and security 
requirements. This includes the creation, establishment, or acquisition of:  food, water, 
shelter, utilities, transportation, fuel, sanitation, interpreters and guides, and security. 
A CCO expected to deploy during this phase of a contingency can plan ahead and 
obtain access to sample documents needed for forming and administering contract 
awards. These documents include statements of work, logs of available contract numbers, 
contract forms, and award checklists. CCOs must remain flexible, as the number of 
available contracting personnel during this phase of a contingency is limited.  The 
predominant types of contract vehicles used during this phase of a contingency operation 
are Standard Form 44s (SF 44) with cash payments; government-wide commercial 
purchase cards; and blanket purchase agreements (BPAs).  In addition, SF 44s act as an 
all-in-one order: invoice and payment voucher with cash payments. 
2. Phase II – Buildup and Stabilization 
The buildup phase of a contingency operation, normally from day 45 onward, 
generally involves a continuation of the initial deployment phase. The main body of 
troops to support the mission will arrive, along with additional contracting personnel; 
however, the number of new contracting personnel may not seem proportionate to the 
number of troops needing support.  Again, the main focus is likely to be basic life-
support and security requirements, with additional priority for: construction and 




gym equipment, etc.), and office equipment.  During this phase, CCOs should focus on 
establishing a solid and reliable vendor base.  This is when there is normally a shift from 
a ―push‖ to a ―pull‖ support strategy.11 
3. Phase III – Sustainment (Post-Buildup until Termination) 
The sustainment phase of a contingency operation runs from the end of the 
buildup stage through the point that redeployment begins. Contracting activities will 
continue to focus on life-support and quality-of-life requirements; however, an increased 
focus will be given to providing permanent facilities and equipment, office supplies, and 
discretionary services. The main priority of a CCO and his or her support team is 
establishing long-term, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts and BPAs 
that consolidate requirements, thus benefiting from economies of scale and reducing 
costs.  Improving contract files and documentation is crucial, as internal controls are 
established to minimize waste and abuse. During this phase, the contracting team also 
focuses on seeking increased competition in its vendor base and on transitioning the 
workload for the next round of contracting personnel for termination and redeployment.12 
4. Phase IV – Termination and Redeployment 
Phase IV is characterized by an urgency to prepare the troops to return home or to 
deploy forward to other areas. The CCO will continue to focus on life-support contracts 
throughout the duration of the mission. This is a particularly challenging phase.  
Contracting personnel will shift priorities towards packing and freight services, and 
transportation, and they will be required to terminate and/or closeout existing contracts 
and orders. This includes ensuring final payment to contractors and closing any open 
issues associated with their contracts. Overall, Phase IV events should complement the 
overall exit strategy. 
During all of these phases, meanwhile, CCOs are responsible for maintaining 
accurate and complete contract files in a complex and high-threat environment, while 
                                                 
11 Yoder, ―MN3318.‖ 
12 Yoder, ―MN3318.‖  
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constantly adapting to new procedures, new technology, and new demands. These 
requirements become even more complicated, and the threat environment often increases, 
when CCOs are deployed to support USSF teams on the front lines. 
5. Phase Zero - Planning, Exercising, and Shaping 
Members of the contracting community are only just beginning to incorporate a 
Phase Zero as the first phase of a contingency operation.  Phase Zero has not yet been 
incorporated into doctrine, more than likely will be included in the near future.  Phase 
Zero refers to the planning, exercising, and shaping phase.  It defines specific actions and 
elements for integrative planning.  Phase Zero includes OPLAN and CONPLAN design, 
exercise, review, and analysis.  It also involves analyzing and integrating stakeholders.13  
The main goal for Phase Zero is to put many contracting mechanisms into place or at 
least start them before Phase I begins.  Phase Zero is the Pre-Mission Training phase for 
contracting. 
C. THE CURRENT STATE OF UNITED STATES ARMY CONTINGENCY 
CONTRACTING  
In September 2007, the Secretary of the Army established an independent 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations to review the lessons learned in recent operations and provide forward-
looking recommendations to ensure that future military operations achieve greater 
effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency.   The commission released its report, ―Urgent 
Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting,‖ more commonly referred to as the 
―Gansler Commission‖ on October 31, 2007.  In 2008, Congress established the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA), which released 
an interim report, ―At What Cost?  Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,‖ in 
June 2009.  The CWCIA released its final report, ―Transforming Wartime Contracting: 
Controlling Costs Reducing Risks in August 2011.  Both of these commissions identified 
numerous concerns and areas for reform in the contingency contracting arena. 
                                                 
13 E. Corey Yoder, ―MN3318 Contingency & Expeditionary Contracting Phase Zero Operations‖ 
(presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 9, 2011). 
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The Gansler commission was one of, if not the first comprehensive study aimed at 
the contingency contracting processes undertaken in support of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT).  The Gansler commission found: 
 The expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced 
military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).  Yet, only 3 
percent of Army contracting personnel are active duty military and there 
are no longer any Army contracting career General Officer (GO) 
positions. 
 The Army‘s acquisition workforce is not adequately staffed, trained, 
structured, or empowered to meet the Army needs of the 21st Century 
deployed warfighters.   Only 56 percent of the military officers and 53 
percent of the civilians in the contracting career field are certified for their 
current positions. 
 Notwithstanding a seven-fold workload increase and greater complexity of 
contracting, the Institutional Army is not supporting this key capability. 
 Notwithstanding there being almost as many contractor personnel in the 
Kuwait/Iraq/Afghanistan Theater as there are U.S. military, the 
Operational Army does not yet recognize the impact of contracting and 
contractors in expeditionary operations on mission success. 
 What should be a core competence—contracting (from requirements 
definition, through contract management, to contract closeout)—is treated 
as an operational and institutional side issue14  
A large portion of the Gansler commission focused on reforms needed at the 
organizational and policy levels.   The report identified four recommended actions based 
on its findings: 
 Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of the Army‘s 
Contracting Personnel, Military and Civilian (Especially for Expeditionary 
Operations) 
 Restructure Organization and restore Responsibility to facilitate 
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS 
operations. 
 Provide Training and Tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary operations. 
                                                 
14 United States Army, Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Commission on 
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations,  ―Gansler Report‖ (October 31, 
2007), 2.  http://www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Commission_Report_Final_071031.pdf (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
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 Obtain Legislative, Regulatory, and Policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness in expeditionary operations15 
Overall, the Gansler commission identified contracting recommendations for the 
Army as a whole. 
For its part, the CWCIA focused its first interim report on the contingency 
contracting practices in Iraq and Afghanistan.  A main part of its mandate was to ―survey 
and assess—but not re-create—the work of others who have examined contracting 
issues,‖ such as the Gansler commission.16  The interim report issued by the CWCIA 
examined the following issues: a) Management and Accountability, b) Logistics, c) 
Security, and d) Reconstruction. 
While the Army has instituted changes to address shortcomings identified in the 
Gansler commission, the CWCIA interim report, published nearly two years later, 
identifies many of the same issues.   In its final report, the CWCIA found: 
 Agencies over-rely on contractors for contingency operations. 
 ‗Inherently governmental‘ rules do not guide appropriate use of 
contractors in contingencies. 
 Inattention to contingency contracting leads to massive waste, fraud, and 
abuse. 
 Looming sustainment costs risk massive new waste. 
 Agencies have not institutionalized acquisition as a core function. 
 Agency structures and authorities prevent effective interagency 
coordination. 
 Contract competition, management, and enforcement are ineffective. 
 The way forward demands major reforms17 
Neither of these reports specifically addresses Special Operations, with the 
exception of a brief mention by the Gansler commission of the United States Special 
                                                 
15 United States Army, Gansler Report, 5. 
16 Department of Defense, At what cost?—Contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,  
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, First Interim Report, (2009, June), 4. 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06–10–09.pdf (accessed 8 
November 2011). 
17 Department of Defense, Transforming Wartime Contracting, 5.   
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Operations Command (USSOCOM) Contingency Contracting Cell (KCC).  The Gansler 
commission identified the KCC ―as a useful example of how to meld the contracting 
functions with the warfighters to ensure the successful accomplishment of the overall 
mission.‖18   The CWCIA ‗s final report has one brief mention of Special Operations 
with regard to Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the contracting for civilian 
agricultural teams.19 
Both of the commissions identified a lack of adequately trained contracting 
personnel, especially CCOs.  Each of the commissions also addressed the need for 
increased training of Contracting Officer Representatives (COR).   
A COR is an important member of the acquisition workforce, especially in a 
contingency contracting environment.  Authorized contracting officers appoint a COR (in 
writing), to perform a number of contract administration and oversight duties.  Many 
CORs perform their contracting roles as an additional duty and receive very little, if any, 
training.  Until recently, Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan at the Advanced 
Operation‘s Base (AOB) level and below did not receive formal COR training.  COR 
training became important following the publication of the Gansler Commission report, 
but as the CWCIA commission notes, ―there is a general lack of COR training, 
insufficient time for military CORs to perform duties, and improper alignment of COR 
skills to the types of service contracts they are required to monitor.‖20    Furthermore, 
COR training was often conducted after arrival in theater and was difficult for some 
soldiers to do due to slow Internet connectivity at their remote locations. 
Although the above reports do not address Special Forces specifically, USSF units 
operate under the same contracting laws as the conventional Army.  Contingency 
contracting within Army Special Operations has been addressed in literature, but to date, 
very little has been aimed at the tactical level.  At the Special Operations Task Force 
(SOTF) and below, there has been little support with few CCOs assigned to directly assist 
                                                 
18 18 United States Army, Gansler Report, 24. 
19 Department of Defense, Transforming Wartime Contracting, 134. 
20 Department of Defense, At what cost?, 9.  
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tactical level commanders with the contracting side of their mission.  In 1999 Major Eric 
C. Wagner published an article for Army Logistician entitled ―Contingency Contracting 
for a Special Forces Group,‖ in which he identifies the need for a CCO at the Special 
Forces Group level.21  In the wake of the Gansler Commission report and the CWCIA‘s 
first interim report, USASOC established the 905th Contingency Contracting Battalion in 
2009.  To date, the 905th has established at least four contingency contracting teams, 
consisting of ―a major, a captain, a sergeant first class and a staff sergeant‖ assigned to 
each of the Special Forces groups.  However, this does not address the need for 
contracting personnel at the tactical level. 
So, the questions remain: how much emphasis on contracting needs to be 
incorporated into pre-mission training?  Who needs to be identified as a COR?   And how 
much training do these CORs need to receive?  Both the Gansler commission and the 
CWCIA reports identified the need for better COR training across the Army, but neither 
addresses the unique missions required by U.S. Special Operations Forces. 
In September 2010, General Petraeus issued COMISAF‘s COIN Contracting 
Guidance.  This guidance focuses on an ‗Afghan First‘ initiative and calls for a 
population–centric approach to contracting.  The contracting procedures for United States 
Special Forces have undergone numerous changes in Afghanistan over the past nine 
years.  Special Forces have a different mission in Afghanistan than conventional forces, 
but when it comes to contracting, the same rules apply. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter defined contingency contracting and provided an overview of the 
current state of contracting in the U.S. Army.  For 236 years, the United States has been 
contracting out logistical support for its military forces.  As long as the military goes to 
war, warfighters will need the support of the contingency contractor.  Recent studies have 
shown that contingency contracting has numerous areas that need reform.  USSF must 
 
                                                 
21 Eric C. Wagner, ―Contingency Contracting for a Special Forces Group,‖ Army Logistician 31, issue 
3 (1999).  http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MayJun99/MS333.htm (accessed 8 November 2011). 
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also address these, especially since USSF will continue to be the tip of the spear for many 
of the nation‘s future contingencies.  The next chapter will take a look at the current 
guidance for COIN contracting. 
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II. MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM: COUNTERINSURGENCY 
CONTRACTING IN AFGHANISTAN 
A. COIN CONTRACTING GUIDANCE 
According to the Money as a Weapons System Handbook, ―unit leaders who use 
proactive management controls to provide timely and accurate funding to warfighters are 
paramount to success or failure on the COIN battlefield.‖22  On 8 September 2010, 
General David H. Petraeus issued the COMISAF‘s Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
Contracting Guidance.  He makes it very clear that ―contracting has to be ‗Commander‘s 
business.‘‖23  He applauds the Afghan First initiative and encourages ISAF to ensure that 
the huge amount of money spent on contracts is spent wisely and meets long-term 
objectives in Afghanistan.  The guidance encourages practices such as Afghan First, 
which has spurred economic development in Afghan businesses like the Kabul Milli Boot 
Factory and the ANA Sewing Factory. 
The COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance provides operational guidance 
consistent with FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, which states that ―some of the best 
weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.‖24 Paragraph 1–153 of FM 3–24 states: 
―Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more 
important effects than bombs and bullets. This is a time when ‗money is ammunition.‘‖25 
GEN Petraeus provides guidance on the proper use of money in contracting in the preface 
of the COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance: 
The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an 
opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur 
economic development and support the Afghan government‘s and ISAF‘s 
campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of 
                                                 
22 Center For Army Lessons Learned, 3.  
23 David H. Petraeus, ―COMISAF‘s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance,‖ memorandum 
for the Commander‘s, Contracting Personnel, Military Personnel, and Civilians of  NATO ISAF and U.S. 
Forces, (Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 8, 2010), 1. 
24 United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–24 (Washington, D.C: Headquarters Department of 
the Army, December 15, 2006), 1–27.  
25 Ibid. 
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international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is 
likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, 
finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, 
and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan. 
In view of these points, contracting has to be ―Commander‘s business.‖ 
Indeed, I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract 
spending and understand who benefits from it. We must use intelligence to 
inform our contracting and ensure those with whom we contract work for 
the best interests of the Afghan people. We must be better buyers and buy 
from better people.26 
The COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance also provides some specific 
guidance that should be followed, consistent with NATO and national contracting laws 
and regulations: 
 Understand the role of contracting in COIN. 
 Hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity. 
 Know those with whom we are contracting. 
 Exercise responsible contracting practices. 
 Integrate contracting into intelligence, plans, and operations. 
 Consult and involve local leaders. 
 Develop new partnerships. 
 Look beyond cost, schedule, and performance. 
 Invest in oversight and enforce contract requirements. 
 Act. 
 Get the story out.27 
 
GEN Petraeus ends his COIN Contracting Guidance with the following: 
We must improve our contracting practices to ensure they fully support 
our mission. However, we must also recognize what our contracting has 
accomplished. Our contracting efforts have sustained widely dispersed and 
high tempo operations and helped build Afghan national security capacity. 
Our contracting has also improved the lives of many Afghans, enhanced 
                                                 
26 Petraeus, ―COMISAF‘s Counterinsurgency,‖ 1. 
27 Ibid. 
 15 
infrastructure, delivered essential services, supported local businesses, 
increased employment, and fostered economic development.28 
Since the issuing of COMISAF‘s COIN Contracting guidance, ISAF has 
developed and implemented plans to establish new procurement and contract execution 
standards that do not benefit the enemy.  A number of investigative units, such as the 
Major Crimes Task Force were established to target illicit financial activity.  ISAF also 
created a process to vet vendors and further prevent the awarding of contracts to 
contractors known to be involved in criminal activity or tied to the enemy. This vetting 
process helped debar or suspend 10 prime contractors with ties to criminal networks or 
the insurgency.  In his written testimony to the CWCIA, Richard Ginman, the Deputy 
Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, cited a number of ISAF 
successes to include:  ―the disarmament of 54 of 57 illegal personal security corporations, 
and 81 ongoing investigations of $6.1B in contracts.  Other sanctions imposed include 35 
criminal convictions, $5M in fines, $3M in restitution, and $3M in seized or forfeited 
property.‖29  
Ginman also addresses the Afghan First program stating that it is: 
… another prominent initiative designed to ensure greater control of our 
spending by doing business with promising Afghan companies in targeted 
economic sectors, including textiles and construction materials.  It has so 
far produced some very encouraging results.  For example, the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) in FY2010 benefitted from $220M in 
high quality clothing and individual equipment manufactured by 11 local 
Afghan vendors, which employ roughly 5,000 Afghans.  Additionally, 
ANSF orders for manufactured commodities (e.g., furniture, tents, 
CONEXes) under the Afghan First program totaled $140M in FY2010, 
which will create new Afghan businesses with 16 local vendors, 
employing approximately 1,800 Afghans.  As the Afghan First initiative 
continues to expand, it will help generate the necessary momentum 
towards building a self-sustainable market demand in Afghanistan.30 
                                                 
28 Petraeus, ―COMISAF‘s Counterinsurgency,‖ 1. 
29 Richard T. Ginman, Statement to The Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan 
(CWCIA), Ensuring Contractor Accountability: Past Performance and Suspension & Debarment Hearing, 
February 28, 2011, 9,  http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011–02–28_testimony-
Ginman.pdf (accessed November 15, 2011). 
30 Ibid, 10. 
 16 
B. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed COMISAF‘s guidance for COIN Contracting.  Spending 
enormous amounts of money in a COIN environment has many benefits and can help 
solve many problems, but the United States must make greater efforts to ensure the 
money is spent wisely and in a manner that will return long term positive effects for the 
betterment of Afghanistan while avoiding wasteful spending.  As the U.S. military 
prepares to reduce the number of troops, it is very likely that Special Operations, 
especially Special Forces, will assume an even greater role as the United States continues 
to support the GIROA.  For this reason,  USSF needs to prepare for a shift and possible 
increase in the amount of contracting it will need.  The next chapter will look at how 
USSF, in particular, is employing money as a weapon system. 
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III. UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES EMPLOYMENT OF 
MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM 
A. OVERVIEW 
Today‘s constantly changing environment continues to place members of the U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) in expeditionary environments that are 
likely to involve high numbers of contingency contracting personnel, often from the host 
nation.  In his Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Steve Bowman writes that  
―Special Operations Forces play an essential role in COIN in Afghanistan, through direct 
action against insurgent leaders.‖31  USSF, in particular, have been the driving force in 
the training and advising of elite Afghan Commando units, and more recently, they have 
employed Village Stability Operations (VSO) which ―employ a bottom-up methodology 
that strengthens and stimulates village social structures to provide security, enable 
development, and nurture local governance.‖32 
At the tactical level, the core element of USSF is the Operational Detachment 
Alpha (ODA).  An ODA consists of 12 Special Forces soldiers with unique skill sets, and 
the detachment is capable of operating independently.  Typically, six ODAs are managed 
and supported by an Advanced Operations Base (AOB).  Three to four AOBs are then 
managed and supported by a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF).  In Afghanistan, 
ODAs have typically operated out of remotely located firebases and partnered with units 
from the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP).  More 
recently however, many ODAs have shifted their focus and have begun conducting VSO.   
AOBs still operate from firebases, many located within larger Forward Operating Bases 
(FOB) run by conventional forces.  In the case of Southern Afghanistan, Special 
Operations Task Force–Kandahar (SOTF-KAF) used to be responsible for Special 
                                                 
31 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military 
Operations, and Issues for Congress, by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, CRS Report RL40156 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, June 8, 2010), 32.  
32 Brian Petit, ―The Fight for the Village: Southern Afghanistan, 2010,‖ Military Review, (May–June, 
2011),  27, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20110630_art007.pdf 
(accessed November 15, 2011).  
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Operations in Regional Command (RC) South, but more recently was split into two 
SOTFs: the Special Operations Task Force–South (SOTF–SOUTH) which operates from 
Camp Brown in Kandahar Airfield and SOTF-SE, located at Forward Operating Base 
(FOB) Ripley.  In addition to ODAs, a SOTF is also responsible for Civil Affairs (CA) 
and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) teams.  These CA and MISO teams 
usually work alongside the AOBs and ODAs.  It is important to note that a SOTF can 
also be manned by units from a Naval Special Warfare Group and/or Marine Special 
Operations Regiment.  However, this thesis will focus primarily on USSF and use SF 
terminology. 
Each ODA, AOB, CA team, MISO team, and the SOTF itself have unique needs 
requiring contractor support.  This support is typically managed through the SOTF 
Support Center (SUPCEN) which consists of the Headquarters Support Company (HSC), 
Service Detachment, and the S4 Shop.  The approval for all contracts however, comes 
from the contingency contracting cell located within the Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF–A), which is the higher headquarters for 
SOTF–SOUTH.  Additionally, some contracts fall under the purview of United States 
Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A) and through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP). 
This thesis does not fully explore the exact structure and details for all of the 
contracting mechanisms in Afghanistan.  Instead, it focuses on how tactical level teams 
and the average COR and/or ODA commander looks at MAAWS.  Simply stated, they 
view money as either coming from an internal source, the CJSOTF, or from an external 
source, the ―Big Army,‖ namely USFOR–A or LOGCAP. 
The ways that USSF currently employs MAAWS are broken down into the 
following categories:  CJSOTF–A, USFOR–A, and LOGCAP.  These categories are the 
basic three sources of funding that the average Special Forces Soldier identifies with 
when they have to manage a current contract or start the process for a new one.  This 
chapter will discuss contingency contracting involving: Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M), Construction, Services, Systems Support, Equipment Fielding, Operations Funds 
(OPFUND), and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds.  One very important way in which 
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USSF employs MAAWS is through the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP).  CERP is a program designed to give commanders the ability to ―respond with a 
nonlethal weapon to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction projects 
and services that immediately assist the indigenous population and that the local  
population or government can sustain.‖33  CERP by itself is an enormous topic and will 
not be discussed in detail as it does not fall within the scope of this thesis.  However, 
many of the ideas explored here have the potential to be applied to CERP as it involves 
many of the concepts dealing with contingency contracting. 
B. CJSOTF LEVEL 
The CJSOTF manages a variety of contracts that fall under the authority and 
contracting framework of USSOCOM.  Construction, Systems Support, Specialized 
Services, Equipment Fielding, Afghanistan Security Forces Funds, and OPFUNDs are the 
major types of contracts that are approved and managed at the CJSOTF level. 
The majority of the USSOCOM–warranted CCOs responsible for CJSOTF 
contracts work out of the contracting cell at the CJSOTF which is headquartered at 
Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.  Major Wyeth Anderson, a former SOTF-SOUTH CCO, 
in a phone conversation with the author, explained that in the summer of 2010, a CCO 
was also assigned to work at SOTF-SOUTH and SOTF-SE.34  These CCOs must 
designate, in writing, CORs located at the AOB, and ODA levels to assist them with the 
managing of their contracts.  Within a SOTF, the S4 is usually the person in charge of 
coordinating between the CORs and CCOs.  Additionally, the S4 often serves as a COR 
himself and helps manage many of the contracts that are in place for the SOTF 
headquarters.  Since the assigning of CCOs to the SOTFs, the S4 has been freed up from 
having to coordinate much of the contracting. 
There is always a demand for construction.  Whether this is for a new firebase, 
increasing the capacity of an old firebase, or converting temporary structures to more 
permanent ones, USSF units always need construction contracts.  While most of the 
                                                 
33 Center For Army Lessons Learned, 13. 
34 Wyeth S. Anderson, phone conversation with the author, December 7, 2011. 
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construction contracts SF teams require are designed to benefit them, these contracts have 
a secondary effect of benefiting the local economy in the village or district in which the 
USSF team operates.  They can help the team build rapport with the people they are here 
to assist.  Some examples would be the building of a cement helicopter landing pad, the 
construction of covered carports to protect vehicles from the elements, and the building 
of a better medical facility. 
Systems Support is another large area where USSF relies on contractor support.  
Increasingly complex vehicles, such as the Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) and the 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, and the different weapon 
systems unique to SOF require the expertise of civilian contractors for training and 
maintenance of these systems.  ManTech, BAE Systems, Kongsberg Defence & 
Aerospace, and L-3 are a few of the companies that currently provide Field Service 
Engineers (FSE) and Field Service Representatives (FSR) to units under USSCOCOM.  
ManTech provides maintenance support for the GMV and MRAP vehicles.  BAE 
Systems provides training on the operation of the GMV, the MRAP, and many of the 
surveillance systems mounted on these vehicles.   Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace was 
recently awarded a contract to provide installation, repair, and training on remote 
weapons stations such as the Common Remotely Operated Weapon System (CROWS).  
L-3 provides many of the communications systems in use by USSF units. 
There are also many specialized services that contractors provide USSF units.  
Probably the most important service comes from interpreters.  Every ODA, AOB, CA 
and MISO team, and the SOTF Headquarters rely on interpreters in order to communicate 
with the local Afghanis.  Interpreters are also critical for negotiating contracts with local 
Afghan companies.  Interpreters are divided into three categories.  Category I interpreters 
are usually local nationals who were originally hired by USSF units.  The USSF units 
managed the payment of these interpreters.  In the last few years, however, these 
interpreters have become employees of larger contracting companies such as Titan, and 
the USSF units are no longer responsible for payment of their interpreters.  Category II 
and III interpreters are mostly American citizens and possess higher security clearances. 
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These interpreters are hired through different contracts than Category I interpreters.  The 
S2 shop in a SOTF typically coordinates with the USSF teams for the hiring and 
management of these interpreters. 
ODAs traditionally operated out of firebases, but the majority of them are now 
living in local villages where they conduct VSO.   Between April 2010 and March 2011 
the number of VSO locations increased from five to 46.35  Whether operating from a 
firebase or from a compound located in an Afghan village, USSF teams often rely on 
private security contracts and the contracting of Afghan Security Guards (ASG) for 
security and base defense.  During the period from March through September 2011, 
SOTF-SE was managing at least seven contracts for ASG.36  These contracts are 
extremely important.  The ASG contracts are often complicated as they share 
characteristics with the personal security contracts, such as those with Blackwater, that 
have surfaced in the news over the past few years.  However, worth noting, is that these 
contracts for ASG are defensive in nature, they are awarded to local nationals, and they 
are used primarily for base defense and some limited convoy security.   USSF units go to 
great lengths to ensure that ASG are used correctly. 
Probably one of the most common ways USSF use MAAWS is through 
OPFUNDs, which are issued to each ODA, AOB, and the SOTF Headquarters.  The 
purpose of the OPFUND is to allow units to purchase services and materials in small 
quantities that are deemed mission essential and are needed quickly.  These services and 
materials are generally not provided through other contracts or the logistical supply 
system.  Each unit that is issued an OPFUND must designate a Paying Agent (PA) and a 
Field Ordering Officer (FOO).  Each FOO and PA must attend mandatory training to 
ensure they understand how to manage the funds they are issued.  The FOO is responsible 
for identifying needs and sources to fulfill those needs.  The PA manages the funds and 
may be held financially liable for all funds entrusted to him/her.  A FOO and PA are 
required to document each and every purchase through the SF 44 (U.S. Government 
                                                 
35 Donald C. Bolduc, ―The Future Of Afghanistan,‖ Special Warfare, 24, no. 4 (October–November–
December 2011). 
36 Wyeth S. Anderson, e-mail message to the author, December 6, 2011. 
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Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher).  When clearing the OPFUND, a FOO and PA first 
clear through their SF 44s through their CCO who will provide a memorandum certifying 
them.  After clearing contracting, the OPFUND is cleared through the resource manager 
and then finally through the finance offices.  In Afghanistan, OPFUNDs are generally 
cleared every other month at which time new funds are drawn, but if a team exhausts an 
OPFUND earlier, it may clear the funds and draw additional funds.  This, of course, is 
subject to approval. 
C. USFOR-A LEVEL 
Within the past couple of years some of the support contracts that USSF units 
relied on and that fell under the USSOCOM contracting framework have transferred over 
to management by USFOR-A and fall under the CCOs assigned to award and manage 
them.  The majority of all contracts are still managed through the CJSOTF, but just like 
anything else, there are always exceptions.  For example, in 2009 some of the contracts at 
SOTF-KAF were awarded through the Regional Contracting Center (RCC) in Kandahar, 
which falls under UFSOR-A.  The SOTF was responsible for coordinating with CJSOTF 
CCOs and USFOR-A CCOs.37  Some of the contracts affected by this change dealt with 
the rental of non-tactical vehicles (NTV) and heavy equipment. 
USSF units in Afghanistan also rely heavily on contracts for the ground 
transportation (trucking) of fuel, food, water, supplies, and equipment.  The majority of 
these contracts are well established and the actual contracting functions are transparent to 
the users.  In the example of ground transportation in Southern Afghanistan, contracts 
with different vendors are already in place and managed by the RCC.  Units such as 
SOTF-SOUTH simply have to request the transportation and provide the details, and the 
office responsible for managing the trucking takes care of the rest.   Sometimes, however, 
USSF units have special requirements causing them to have to go beyond the terms of a 
contract already in place and a new contract has to be written and awarded.  There are 
times when a SOTF can benefit from a contract that exists outside of the CJSOTF sphere 
of influence.  This, however, is not the norm and is handled on a case-by-case basis.  
                                                 
37 Daniel Azzone, telephone conversation with the author, November 20, 2011. 
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D. LOGCAP 
The LOGCAP is designed to assist the Army with logistics, engineering, and 
construction projects during a contingency.  To increase efficiency and the combat-to-
support force ratio, U.S. forces shifted previously completely organic combat service 
support to a logistics plan predicated upon contracted, civilian support for life support 
services.38  The LOGCAP contract is the Army‘s largest contract and, until recently with 
the move towards VSO, just about every USSF unit in Southern Afghanistan received 
some type of service under the LOGCAP contract. 
Many of the O&M related contracts fall under LOGCAP.  When ODAs were 
operating primarily out of remotely located firebases, many of their generators, and 
buildings, and the plumbing and electrical grids were maintained through the LOGCAP.  
Under LOGCAP III, Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) provided these services through a 
ring route system.  KBR workers would travel to the firebases, usually once a month, to 
service anything listed on their density list.  CORs at each location could also submit 
work requests through the SOTF SUPCEN who would then coordinate with LOGCAP to 
schedule additional times, outside of the normal ring route schedule, for the contractor to 
visit the firebase and complete the work order. 
The AOBs and SOTF-KAF also received services under the LOGCAP.  These 
services generally involved more than the ring route locations because the AOB locations 
and Camp Brown, the SOTF-KAF location, were tied into large FOBs which also 
received services from LOGCAP. 
Starting in 2010, LOGCAP III began to transition to LOGCAP IV and Dyncorp 
replaced KBR as the LOGCAP service provider in Kandahar.  This transition was 
initially complicated for SOTF-KAF as Dyncorp was no longer going to use the ring 
route service schedule. However, these complications were short lived as ODAs 
transitioned from operating out of firebases to VSO. 
LOGCAP remains important and provides many services to the AOBs and the 
SOTF.  The SOTF, additionally, will turn to LOGCAP for emergency work orders 
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especially for electrical and plumbing issues.  Following an Inspector General 
Assessment of Electrical Safety in Afghanistan in July 2009, Camp Brown was identified 
as having a number of electrical deficiencies.39  The deficiencies identified were in 
buildings not maintained through LOGCAP.  But, in order to make the buildings safe, an 
emergency work order was placed and KBR inspected and performed temporary fixes.  
As Dyncorp took over the LOGCAP contract in the transition from LOGCAP III to IV, it 
provided permanent fixes to the deficiencies.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of how USSF units employ MAAWS in 
Afghanistan.  The SOTF and its subordinate units in Southern Afghanistan were used as 
examples, but MAAWS is similarly used by USSF units throughout Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  From the tactical level view, contracts belong to one of three categories: CJSOTF-
A, USFOR-A, and LOGCAP.  These three categories describe more or less where the 
authority for a contract comes from.  In the example of SOTF-KAF, the SUPCEN at 
Camp Brown is required to facilitate contracts and provide CORs for three different 
contracting centers.  This often created confusion and lengthened the time it took for 
contracts to go through.  Recently, SOTF-KAF was split into SOTF-SOUTH and SOTF-
SE and CCOs were assigned to each.  In the next chapter, this thesis will look at the 
friction areas between contracting guidance and the ways in which USSF are employing 
MAAWS. 
 
                                                 
39 United States Department of Defense Inspector General, ―Assessment of Electrical Safety in 
Afghanistan,‖ Report No. SPO-2009–005 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense Office of Inspector 
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IV.  AREAS OF FRICTION BETWEEN GUIDANCE AND 
EMPLOYMENT: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. 
―fric‘tion, n.  1. rubbing of one object against another, 2. conflict‖ 
–Webster‘s New Pocket Dictionary 
A. OVERVIEW 
When looking at the guidance for COIN contracting and how USSF are 
employing MAAWS, one can identify areas of friction.  According to Webster‘s, friction 
can be defined as ―conflict.‖40  For the purposes of this thesis, an area of friction exists 
where there is likely conflict between guidance about how to employ COIN contracting 
and how tactical level commanders actually employ MAAWS.  These areas of friction 
can be viewed through the lenses of the past, present, and future.  Past areas of friction 
either disappear or are mitigated and provide valuable lessons learned.  Present areas of 
friction are those that spark conflicts that need to be addressed now.  And future areas of 
friction are those that can be foreseen and mitigated through prior planning.  This chapter 
will identify some of the past, present, and future areas of.  Recommendations for how to 
reduce and/or eliminate these areas of friction will be presented in Chapter V.   
B. LACK OF TRAINING 
Three of the points identified in ISAF‘s guidance on COIN contracting are: 
―Understand the role of contracting in COIN;‖ ―Exercise responsible contracting 
practices;‖ and ―Invest in oversight and enforce contracting requirements.‖41  The 
LOGCAP contract is the largest Army contract.  LOGCAP provides basic services to 
bases depending on the size of the base and the number of personnel assigned to a 
location.42  Under LOGCAP III, in Southern Afghanistan, KBR was providing ring route 
services to just about every firebase under SOTF-KAF.  In a phone conversation with 
Major Daniel Azzone, a former S4 for SOTF-KAF, he explained that the lack of any 
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41 Petraeus, ―COMISAF‘s Counterinsurgency,‖ 1. 
42 Center For Army Lessons Learned, 33. 
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trained contingency contracting personnel at the SOTF, poorly trained CORs at each 
location, and a general lack of knowledge about using LOGCAP within the SOTF 
SUPCEN created a lot of friction when LOGCAP support was needed.43  Overall, the 
exact role that LOGCAP played was often misunderstood and it often took a very long 
time to get things fixed.  Firebases, to include Camp Brown, had generators and buildings 
on the KBR density list, as well as generators and buildings not on the density list.  This 
made it difficult when a contractor would visit a location to service a generator or fix an 
electrical or plumbing problem in a specific building, but could not perform the same 
services on a different generator or building because it was not on the density list.  From 
a USSF operator perspective, a contracted electrician is a contractor who can fix 
electrical problems.  There is very little understanding, even among CORs, about how 
contracting task orders are executed and which contractors if any are responsible for what 
services. 
I will categorize this area of friction as past or historical, because the majority of 
USSF teams in Afghanistan are now conducting VSO, and LOGCAP support at these 
locations is not needed.  But, at the locations co-located with FOBs, like Camp Brown, 
and on the permanent firebases that are still being occupied, friction still exists.  In the 
conversation with Major Azzone, he noted that this friction is especially high when USSF 
units are replaced by new units and the new leadership is forced to learn how LOGCAP 
works through ―on the job training.‖44 
Another area of friction is the training of CORs.  As mentioned in Chapter I, 
serving as CORs within USSF is usually an additional duty.  Many times these CORs 
have the basic technical knowledge to oversee contracts.  For example, a Special Forces 
Engineer Sergeant has basic knowledge about construction, electrical systems, and 
plumbing, and therefore can manage contracts that deal with these types of services.  
However, there is still a lack of training about exactly how contracting works and how 
contracts should be managed.  In 2009, a greater emphasis was finally placed on 
designating CORs for each location where a contract existed, but this emphasis occurred 
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after the units arrived in Afghanistan and the COR training had to be conducted online.45  
Problems with bandwidth made it difficult for the CORs to undergo the training, and 
since being a COR was really an additional duty, it very quickly became less of a priority.   
In many instances, the SOTF S4, who was a trained COR, was designated as the 
COR for contracts at remote firebases solely to keep them going.46  The lack of training 
by both the outgoing and incoming units was very apparent as USSF units did not 
understand how LOGCAP worked, which buildings were on the density list, how to 
submit a work order, and/or how to manage the contract to include quality assurance. 
For CCOs to effectively manage a contract, they must rely heavily on their CORs 
to keep them informed.  This can be difficult when the COR has little technical 
knowledge regarding the contract or simply lacks knowledge about the contracting 
process in general. 
C. NO CCO ASSIGNED AT THE SOTF LEVEL 
Again, when looking at the guidance to: ―Understand the role of contracting in 
COIN‖ and ―Exercise responsible contracting practices,‖ friction existed in the past and 
will exist in the future as long as a trained CCO is not assigned down to the SOTF level.  
In a typical SOTF, the S4 is usually the person responsible for contracting and handles 
much of the activity that goes on during Phase Zero.  However, an S4 is not a CCO and 
there are no 51C, Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology Contracting NCOs assigned to 
the S4 section in an SF Battalion.  This makes contracting an additional duty for the S4 
and makes it difficult for him to plan, execute, and advise the commander on contracting–
related functions. 
In an e-mail message to the author, Captain Andy Petersen, a former CJSOTF-A 
CCO,  explained that the S4 for a SOTF usually has to coordinate with the CCO located 
at the CJSOTF, who is the person ultimately responsible for the SOTF‘s contracts.  In the 
case of the SOTF located at Bagram, this is not very difficult as the CJSOTF is located in 
the same area.  But for the other SOTFs, like SOTF-KAF in 2009, this coordination had 
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to occur via e-mail and phone communications.  If the S4 has little contracting 
experience, this creates an even bigger gap.  Furthermore, in the past, the CJSOTF CCO 
was typically an Air Force Officer who had no prior experience working with USSF or 
the particular CJSOTF and was filling the position from a Joint Manning Document 
(JMD) fill.47  This has been addressed recently, however, with the establishment of the 
905th Contingency Contracting Battalion (CCB) assigned to USASOC.  The 905th CCB 
has assigned each Special Forces Group a contingency contracting team.  As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the 905th CCB assigned CCOs to SOTF-SOUTH and SOTF-SE 
in the summer of 2010.  These CCOs, however, were assigned through Special 
Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and are not a permanent billet within the 
SOTF.48  This addressed a cause of past friction where the S4 was solely responsible for 
coordinating contracting, and it minimizes friction now ,especially with regard to the 
activities that occur in Phases 1–4.  However, until these CCOs become a permanent part 
of an SF Battalion Staff, the potential remains for future friction especially during Phase 
Zero activities.  
The lack of a CCO at the SOTF level creates friction when trying to ―integrate 
contracting into intelligence, plans, and operations,‖ another point in ISAF‘s COIN 
contracting guidance.49  It is virtually impossible for a CCO located at the CJSOTF to 
have a realistic understanding of what is going on at the SOTF level because they are not 
co-located and do not attend the same planning meetings and Commander‘s Update Brief 
(CUB).  The CJSOTF contracting cell has far too many contracts to manage to allow staff 
to truly understand and assist with the planning and integration of contracting into the 
intelligence, plans, and operations each SOTF commander handles on a day to day basis.  
For example, in 2009, the CJSOTF had only two contracting personnel, an Air Force 
Captain and a Specialist, who were responsible for all of the contracts for every unit 
under the CJSOTF.50   Due to the enormous number of contracts and the workload 
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involved, these CCOs never had the time to visit their CORs face to face or really get a 
feel for the status of the contracts they managed.  Rare exceptions may occur for a 
contract with a lot of visibility from higher up.  For example, in 2009 when the firebase 
for the Jordanian SOF was being built, the initial timeline had to be pushed back.  This 
resulted in a lot of visibility from high up the chain of command, and consequently 
caused everyone involved to spend more time supervising the contract.51  However, this 
was unusual, and the CCOs at the CJSOTF do not have the time to allot this same amount 
of attention to the other contracts. 
Again, this friction has currently been mitigated through the assignment of CCOs 
at the SOTF level.  However, the future will depend on maintaining these assignments.  
The assignment of CCOs to the SOTFs through SOCCENT is a temporary fix that 
reduces the friction during Phases 1–4, but in order for a SOTF to really maximize their 
contracting, it must also incorporate the activities that occur during Phase Zero.   
D. AFGHAN FIRST 
Some other important elements of ISAF‘s guidance on COIN contracting are: 
―Hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity, know those with 
whom we are contracting, consult and involve local leaders, and develop new 
partnerships.‖52  A USSF team must build rapport with the local population whose 
villages/cities they operate in and around.  When a team identifies a need for something, 
such as the building of a cement helicopter landing pad or ASG to help protect its 
firebase, it must go through the contracting process.  The team will typically coordinate 
with the local village elders that it works with to identify a company or a person within 
the village who can fulfill the contract.  However, the contract must still go through the 
proper bidding and awards process and oftentimes the contract is awarded to a different 
company than the team originally had in mind.  Many times the company awarded the 
contract works out of Kabul and purchases materials and hires laborers from different 
locations and not from where the work is actually being performed.  The contract does 
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follow the letter of the law and the spirit of the guidance:  a trusted Afghan company that 
has typically done prior work for the United States, and uses Afghan products is hired, 
but not hiring locals still causes friction between the team and the villagers they work 
with.   Counter-productive friction arises when the local villagers see the labor being 
done by Afghans from different villages and different tribes, and the money that is spent 
on the contract does not benefit the local village in any way.  Sure the team still gets its 
landing pad or its ASG forces.  But, all the positive second and third order effects that 
could be gained by directly involving their local Afghan hosts are negated. 
This friction was more prevalent in the past prior to the emphasis placed on 
supporting local villages via VSO, but friction still exists and definitely has the potential 
to persist so long as the CCOs responsible for awarding the contract do not a have a 
really good feel for the more subtle benefits and second and third order effects of the 
contract.    
E. MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHHOLDS FOR OPFUND 
ODAs and AOBs are probably more knowledgeable and efficient at managing 
OPFUNDs than any other aspect of using money as a weapon system.  FOOs and PAs 
receive more training than the typical soldier assigned to be a COR.  However, FOOs are 
limited by the micro-purchase thresholds placed on them.  The current micro-purchase 
threshold for OPFUND use is $3,000 USD for supplies, $2,500 USD for services, and 
$2,000 USD for construction.53  If a FOO required a purchase that exceeded these 
thresholds, then he would be required to talk to his CCO for guidance.  Many times, the 
overworked CCO would tell the FOO to go through the normal contracting process.  
According to FAR 13, under Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) during a declared 
contingency located OCONUS, the micro-purchase threshold for a warranted CCO is 
$25k USD.54   SAP does not waive the need for a CCO to solicit competition, but grants 
a lot of flexibility beyond the limitations of a FOO.  However, due to their workload, 
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CCOs generally do not have the time to fully employ MAAWS to their maximum ability 
and the average FOO or COR does not have the knowledge to really help the CCO out 
without first being walked through the entire process.  This is where yet more friction 
originates. 
According to guidance states, the military must ―invest in oversight and enforce 
contract requirements,‖ as well as ―exercise responsible contracting processes.‖55  
Imagine that a team has a genuine need, the need is time-critical, but it exceeds the 
purchase threshold the FOO is bound to follow.  This can put the FOO in an ethical 
dilemma.  Does he fulfill the need through a split purchase and attempt to cover up what 
he is really doing?  Does he consult the CCO who is most likely going to tell him to 
submit the paperwork for what he hears to be a larger contract action, which will most 
likely take more time?  Usually, what happens, thanks to all these potential pitfall, is the 
need is abandoned and the team goes without, or the team submits the paperwork for a 
contract, but never sees the contract come through over the course of its rotation.  A 
follow–on team reaps the reward or no longer recognizes the need when the contract 
finally does come through.   
Most USSF soldiers have heard stories about the team that purchased large 
amounts of wood or gravel using OPFUNDs.  People automatically assume a split 
purchase was done or that the team had to have violated some regulation, because how 
much wood and gravel does a team actually need?  On some occasions these assumptions 
are correct and the team used its OPFUND for an unauthorized purchase.  This causes 
even more friction.    
It is definitely important to follow the guidance to ―invest in oversight and 
enforce contract requirements,‖ but due to a lack of knowledge of contracting by most 
FOOs or CORs and the enormous workload CCOs have; corners are often cut to get 
things paid for.      
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F. LACK OF PLANNING AND EXERCISING 
A final area of friction that limits USSF ability to ―integrate contracting into 
intelligence, plans, and operations,‖ comes from the lack of planning on SOTF-level 
contracting performed during Pre-Mission Training, or what can be referred to as Phase 
Zero.56  While Phase Zero in the current literature applies to OPLANs and CONPLANs 
aimed at higher levels of command, the basic ideas of planning, exercising, and shaping 
can be adapted to the tactical level as well.  A typical SOTF spends an enormous amount 
of time and effort to ensure its soldiers are trained on all aspects of shooting, moving, and 
communicating.  Select members from the SOTF Headquarters, each AOB, and each 
ODA will also conduct a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) to learn as much as 
possible about the area they are going to.  PMT serves as the culmination exercise when 
all of their training is put together in as realistic an environment as possible.  But, it 
involves very little training or practicing of contracting. 
Administrative topics such as rules of engagement, logistics, local customs and 
courtesies, and contracting are covered during an Academic Week.  This is where CORs, 
FOOs, and PAs receive their mandatory block of training, and some training on 
―purchasing‖ is emphasized to commanders and logistics personnel.  At the end of PMT 
and Academic Week, the SOTF is ready to deploy, and it is no doubt proficient on how to 
shoot, move, and communicate, but it is behind the power curve on its ability to 
effectively and efficiently employ MAAWS.  Probably the most training USSF teams 
receive regarding contracting occurs during the Relief in Place and Transfer of Authority 
(RIP/TOA) process that occurs between the outgoing and incoming teams.  This is when 
they gather all the last minute knowledge they can about how things work. 
Even though CCOs are currently assigned to SOTF-SOUTH and SOTF-SE, these 
CCOs help mitigate the present friction.  But, because they are not present with the 
SOTFs during their entire pre-mission training, their ability to assist with Phase Zero 
operations is minimal at best.  Until CCOs are permanently assigned at the SOTF level, 
this friction area will continue to be present during Phase Zero operations. 
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G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, some areas of friction between ISAF‘s guidance on COIN 
contracting and the way USSF units employ MAAWS were identified.  Friction was 
defined as a conflict between the guidance and actual employment of MAAWS.  Past 
areas of friction occurred primarily due to a lack of training, as well as the lack of a CCO 
assigned at the SOTF level.  There was also friction created when contracts followed 
Afghan First guidance, for instance, but did not fully take into account the second and 
third order effects of the contract as teams try to build rapport with the local Afghans they 
work with.  Another area of friction exists because CCOs at the CJSOTF level do not 
have the time to get involved with all of the FOOs and CORs who represent them; there 
is simply too much work they are responsible for.  While much of this friction has been 
reduced with the assignment of CCOs to the SOTF, it only addresses the friction that 
occurs during Phases 1–4.  A final area of friction occurs and will continue to occur 
during Phase Zero, due to a lack of contract planning and exercising during pre-mission 
training and academic week. 
In the next chapter, recommendations for ways to reduce and/or eliminate these 
areas of frictions will be discussed. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
―Delay and denial are not good options. There will be a next contingency, 
whether the crisis takes the form of overseas hostilities or domestic response to a national 
emergency like a mass-casualty terror attack or natural disaster.  Reform will save lives 
and money, and support U.S. interests. Reform is essential. Now.‖ 
–CWCIA 
A. OVERVIEW 
Chapter IV identified some of the friction areas between ISAF‘s guidance on 
COIN contracting and the ways that USSF employ MAAWS.  The Gansler Commission  
and CWCIA reports both identified many similar areas of friction when they looked at 
contingency contracting across the U.S. Army and the whole U.S. Military.  While the 
Gansler Commission and the CWCIA provided recommendations focused at a much 
higher level, starting with Congress and then looking at the whole military, they both still 
addressed a need for more contracting personnel and better training on contingency 
contracting at all levels.  This final chapter will provide recommendations to minimize 
the areas of friction discussed in the previous chapter.  These recommendations will also 
provide the first steps necessary for USSF to establish its proficiency in the employment 
of MAAWS more effectively and efficiently in future contingencies.     
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Increased Training 
The first step to really understanding the role of contracting in COIN is through 
an increase in training on contracting.  USSF have already proven that their 
professionalism, skill sets, and cultural training are a force multiplier in a COIN 
environment such as Afghanistan.  Through VSO and FID, USSF ODAs conduct an 
extremely important function tied in to the overall mission of ISAF and that of the 
battlespace owners where USSF ODAs operate.57  USSF understands COIN, but in order 
to more efficiently and effectively employ MAAWS the regiment must focus more 
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attention on learning about how contracting works.  The single best thing USSF can do is 
to provide better training to designated CORs and Commanders. 
Due to a lack of trained contracting personnel across the whole Army, it is safe to 
assume that contracting personnel will not be assigned at the AOB and ODA level 
anytime soon.  As a result, the COR role will still be performed by Special Forces NCOs.  
Greater emphasis must be placed on the COR role by commanders at all levels to remove 
the stigma that it is ―just another additional duty.‖ 
This COR training should focus heavily on ethics as the ―pressures to meet 
mission requirements can be even more intense in a contingency contracting 
environment.‖58  This can be accomplished through the 905th Contingency Contracting 
Battalion or the Defense Acquisition University (DAU).  Just as mobile training teams 
(MTT) for mortars and other weapons systems are brought on temporary duty (TDY) to 
provide refresher training on these weapons systems, so too could a ―COR MTT‖ be 
established through the DAU to provide designated CORs with face-to-face instruction.  
This type of instruction would be far more valuable than the ―check the block‖ online 
training that is currently in place for CORs. 
Commanders at all levels, especially the HSC Commander, AOB Commanders, 
and ODA Commanders, and logistics staffs need more training on contracting.  In his 
guidance on COIN contracting, General Petraeus made it very clear that contracting has 
to be ―Commander‘s business.‖59  Commanders must understand the role of a CCO and a 
COR so they can provide sound guidance and give orders that will not put CCOs, CORs, 
and FOOs in uncomfortable ethical positions.  Leaders can accomplish this training by 
attending the Operational Contracting Support Course offered by the Army Logistics 
University.  The Operational Contracting Support Course, normally designed to train 
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brigade staff officers in contracting support planning and management, is a two–week 
course designed to teach any individuals who may handle contracts.60 
Training on contingency contracting should not be limited to an Academic Week, 
but should be conducted whenever time permits.  Academic Week should be refresher 
training, not the first time a commander or soldier is exposed to the details of contracting.   
The HSC Commander and S4 need advanced training on contracting so they can 
better implement it into the overall logistics plan.  Without a CCO at the SOTF level, 
contracting is going to fall on the shoulders of these two officers, so it is paramount that 
they understand it and know how to best employ it.    This is especially important for 
LOGCAP since it plays an important role in logistics planning and execution. 
2. Continue to Assign CCO at the SOTF Level 
Boosting training for SF personnel on the details of contracting can only go so far.  
A trained CCO with one to two other contracting personnel need to be assigned at the SF 
Battalion level.  This will allow a SOTF commander to better incorporate contracting into 
intelligence, plans, and operations.  Just as the commander has his staff to advise him on 
personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, civil affairs, legal matters, 
and spiritual matters, so too should the commander have someone to advise him on 
contracting.  Having a CCO at the SOTF level will bring the CCO closer to the actual 
fight so that he better understands USSF‘s unique requirements.  The CCO will have 
fewer contracts to manage and more time to interface with his CORs.  A CCO at the 
SOTF level will also be a person with the expertise to bridge the gaps when dealing with 
contracting personnel outside of the CJSOTF, such as at USFOR-A and LOGCAP.  
Furthermore, an assigned CCO will free up the S4 so he can focus on his primary job of 
logistics and not have to worry so much about the details of contracting.  While this is 
 
 
                                                 
60 Tony Hawkins, ―Operational contracting support adds capabilities for special ops Soldiers,‖ The 
Official Homepage of the Unites State Army new article, April 20, 2010.  
http://www.army.mil/article/37641/Operational_contracting_support_adds_capabilities_for_special_ops_S
oldiers/ (accessed December 6, 2011). 
 38 
currently being done in Afghanistan, I recommend that a CCO be permanently assigned 
at the SOTF level.  This will allow the CCO to advise and assist the commander during 
all five phases of a contingency operation. 
3. Afghan First 
USSF teams understand the importance of the Afghan First model.  ODAs rely on 
the rapport they build with the local elders and villagers where they operate.  As CORs 
and Commanders become better versed about how contracting works, they can better 
assist their CCOs when drafting requests and statements of work.  CORs are asked to 
include the reasons why a certain company needs to be sole sourced for a contract or why 
a contract must be performed in a specific matter.  This provides the CCO with the 
information he needs to ensure the contract meets the objectives and takes into account 
the second and third order effects and more longer-term aims.  Furthermore, it ensures 
that this is written correctly and in accordance with all regulations.  Furthermore, CCOs 
need to be able to visit the locations where these contracts are needed so they fully 
understand what the intent is.  Having a CCO with one or two other trained contracting 
personnel assigned to the SOTF will accomplish this. 
Another manner in which this area of friction can be mitigated is through 
planning prior to a deployment.  CCOs can provide their CORs with templates and other 
documents to help smooth out the contracting process and shorten the timeline for 
contracts to be processed and awarded.  
4. Micro-Purchase Threshold 
The micro-purchase thresholds for FOOs exist to ensure that FOOs do not violate 
regulations, or in the rare case that they do, help them recover from their mistake.  Again, 
training and the assignment of a CCO to the SOTF is a key element to reducing the 
friction here.  As FOOs become more knowledgeable, they can assemble the 
documentation a CCO requires to grant an exception.  Furthermore, a CCO directly-
assigned to the SOTF will have an easier time assisting FOOs with requirements that 
exceed their thresholds since the purchase threshold for a warranted CCO is much higher.  
The CCO would actually have the time and means to visit the FOO‘s location and advise 
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him accordingly.  The SOCCENT CCOs are currently doing this in Afghanistan, which 
allows them to have first–hand knowledge of the contracts needed.  These CCOs also 
have more time to regularly interface with their CORs and can maximize the use of $25k 
threshold more effectively and efficiently.61  These CCOs positions need to become 
permanent assignments. 
5. Better Planning and Execution 
Until USSF addresses the need for a permanent CCO assigned at the SOTF level 
and provides further training for CORs and Commanders, it will be difficult to address 
the friction caused by a lack of planning and execution.  An S4 along with Commanders 
and CORs that have a solid understanding of the contracting process can help reduce the 
friction, but currently this expertise varies from person to person and does not completely 
address the need for dedicated contracting personnel across the entire regiment. 
a. Adaptation of Phase Zero62 
The first thing that needs to be done to minimize the friction in this area is 
to adapt the concept of Phase Zero into pre-mission training.  This would involve 
coordinating for COR MTTs, as well as provide training for commanders prior to a PDSS 
and the final PMT exercise.  CORs and commanders would need to have the basic 
training to incorporate a contracting checklist into their PDSS checklist.  They would also 
be armed with the knowledge to ask the right questions to ask during the PDSS regarding 
contracting–related matters.  After the PDSS, commanders and CORs would then have a 
better appreciation for the types of contracts at their deployment locations, as well as 
about contracts they might need in the future.  With this information they could start to 
plan accordingly and could even incorporate the contracting process for one of these 
future contracts into their unit‘s final PMT exercise.  This would get the whole team 
involved and force the COR to go through the motions of the contracting process.  On the 
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completion of PMT, the entire team would have a better understanding of the process and 
would have a solid working document that could be submitted prior to or shortly after 
arriving in-country. 
Once a CCO is permanently assigned to the SOTF, the incorporation of a 
Phase Zero would be much easier.  The CCO would go on the PDSS and would 
consequently know exactly what contracts are in place and which ones might be needed 
in the future.  The CCO would have more time to tailor training and guidance for the 
CORs and be able to incorporate the contracting process into the PMT exercise in a way 
that produces useful documents.  Furthermore, the CCO would be able to advise the 
commander and his staff on how to best incorporate contracting into their intelligence, 
planning, and operations. 
b. Model Based on the Yoder Three-Tier Model 
The Yoder Three-Tier Model is a model developed by Commander 
(Retired) E. Cory Yoder, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Yoder‘s model 
answers the call for ―better planning, coordination, and integration of contracting 
operations with broader theater-support elements—with intent to more efficiently and 
effectively accomplish theater objectives.‖63  The Yoder Three-Tier Model is actually 
comprised of three models for the employment of CCOs:  the ordering officer model, the 
leveraging contractor officer (LCO) model, and the integrated planner and executor (IPE) 
model.  Each of the three models performs unique functions, and requires specific 
education and unique personnel. 
(1) Ordering Officer Model. This model is designed for the 
most rudimentary level of contracting support, which includes functions such as placing 
orders against existing theater contracts. By nature, this requires little interactive 
engagement with experienced personnel in the environment and is best suited for 
warranted junior officers and junior enlisted personnel.  
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(2) Leveraging Contracting Officer Model.  This is the next higher 
level that includes the basic ordering functions of the ordering officer model, but also 
leverages the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the 
contingent theatre.  The practitioner in the leveraging model will be engaged in 
interfacing with local and regional businesses, creating business processes, and 
potentially coordinating with higher military, Non-governmental Organizations and 
Private Volunteer Organizations (NGO/PVO) and political organizations. Thus, only 
higher-level, more qualified and capable practitioners should perform in the leverage 
model. A shortfall of this model is that the CCO may or may not be integrated with the 
broader goals of national and theatre objectives. In the worst case, some of the tactical 
execution may actually run counter to those higher-level goals. 
(3) The Integrated Planner and Executor Model. This model takes 
the leveraging contracting officer function one giant step forward. In this model, well 
educated and qualified CCOs are integrated into the operational-planning phases of 
contingencies—often before actual troop deployment; they then make the transition to 
operations. The hallmark of this model is that contingency contracting operations may be 
planned and subsequently executed to meet National Strategic and theatre objectives. 
Additionally, the myriad NGOs and PVOs—which, in many cases, are essential to the 
overall efficiency, effectiveness, and success of operations—can be integrated into the 
planning and execution of contingency operations. While this integration requirement 
may seem obvious, the integrated planning and execution among warfighters, CCOs, and 
NGOs and PVOs is not; such integration does not occur on a regular basis. 64 
According to this model, the IPE CCO can be utilized in a broader 
planning-and-execution role. The CCO, with higher-level certification, education and 
experience, should be integrated within the J-4 and J-5 logistics and planning/operations 
and exercise organization structure. Integration is essential to achieve desired synergies 
between the myriad organizations operating in contingency environments.  Operational 
92 planners can also leverage integration of all theatre players (military, NGOs/PVOs, 
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and contractors) to achieve harmony between the National Security Strategy (NSS), the 
Combatant Commander (COCOM), and significant NGOs‘ and PVOs‘ objectives. This 
integrated planning, exercising, and execution may: help in eliminating competing (and 
often conflicting) demands of the participants; closely marry acquisition support with 
stated objectives; allow for the creation of robust contingency contract support plans; and 
integrate such plans into broader operational plans in support of theatre operations. The 
higher-order IPE calls for the most highly educated and seasoned planners and 
operational/theatre-level planners.65 
The Yoder Three-Tier Model is suitable for a contingency environment 
regardless of the military service being employed.  With a few modifications, it can also 
be adapted to fit within a CJSOTF concept of operations.  It will allow for better 
acquisition planning and coordination of tactical and operational support to the 
warfighter.  A representation of the model is found in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
65 Yoder, ―The Yoder Three-tier,‖ 15. 
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Model Tier Level & Model Title Functions/Education/Rank Highlights and Drawbacks 
Ordering Officer—Tier One 
 basic ordering 
 some simplified acquisitions 
 training: DAU CON 234 
 DAWIA Certified CON Level I or 
II 
 junior to mid-enlisted, junior 
officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 series 
civilians 
 simple buys 
 little integration 
 no operational planning 
 no broad liaison functions 
Leveraging Contracting 
Officer—Tier Two 
 leverages local economy 
 reduces ―pushed‖ material 
 training/education: DAU CON 
234, recommended higher 
education 
 DAWIA Certified CON Level II 
or III 
 senior enlisted, junior to mid-
grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 
series civilians 
 better local operational 
planning 
 some integration 
 more capability for the 
operational commander 
 no planned theater 
integration 
 no broad liaison functions 
 may perform to optimize 
local operations at the 
detriment to theater ops 
Integrated Planner and 
Executor—Tier Three 
 highest level of planning and 
integration—joint 
 linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5 
 creates and executes OPLAN 
CCO strategy 
 provides direction to tier two and 
one 
 links operations strategically to 
theater objectives of COCOM 
 education: Master‘s degree or 
higher and JPME Phase I and II 
 DAWIA Certified CON Level III, 
and other DAWIA disciplines 
(LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) 
 senior officers (O-6+), senior 
civilians, GS-13+ or SES 
 performs operational and 
theater analysis,  integrates 
results into OPLAN 
 link between COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater 
contracting operations 
 coordinates theater 
objectives with best 
approach to contracted 
support 
 can achieve broader national 
security goals through 
effective distribution of 
national assets 
 includes planning, 
communication, 
coordination, and exercising 
with NGOs and PVOs in 
theater 
 
Table 1.   Yoder Three-Tier Model (From Yoder, 2004) 
C. YODER THREE-TIER MODEL MODIFIED TO MEET USSF NEEDS 
The current contracting set-up within USSF does not currently reach down to the 
SOTF level except through the assigning of CORs as an additional duty and the 
temporary assignment of CCOs during Phases 1–4.  With some modifications, the Yoder 
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Three-Tier Model can be adapted to fit the needs of USSF.  The CJSOTF and Combined 
Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC) currently have personnel 
within their contracting cells whose functions and education resemble the LCO model 
proposed by Yoder.  The IPE model is currently represented at the USSOCOM level.  
What is lacking in the LCO model at the CJSOTF is a senior contracting officer.  This 
should be filled by a field-grade officer with a significant amount of contracting 
experience.  Also completely lacking, is anyone to fit the Ordering Officer model.  
Consequently, I recommend that the Ordering Officer model be represented at the SOTF 
level with some modifications.  Since the overall mission of SOTF has operational 
characteristics, the Ordering Officer model at the SOTF level should closely resemble the 
LCO model at the CJSOTF.  The SOTF level should be filled by a junior officer to senior 
enlisted CCO, as well as two or three junior to mid-enlisted 52C who can assist the CCO 




Model Tier Level & Model Title Functions/Education/Rank Highlights and Drawbacks 
Ordering Officer—Tier One 
*SOTF (SF BN) Level 
 basic ordering 
 some simplified acquisitions 
 leverages local economy 
 reduces ―pushed‖ material 
 training: DAU CON 234, 
recommended higher 
 DAWIA Certified CON Level II 
or III 
 1 x junior officer or senior 
enlisted and  2–3 x  junior to 
mid-enlisted 
 simple buys 
 some integration 
 better local operational 
planning 
 more capability for the 
commander 
 no broad liaison functions 
 personnel can serve as 
―traveling CORs‖ to assist 
AOBs and ODAs 
Leveraging Contracting 
Officer—Tier Two 
*CJSOTF (SF Group) 
Level 
*CFSOCC Level 
 leverages local economy 
 reduces ―pushed‖ material 
 training/education: DAU CON 
234, recommended higher 
education 
 DAWIA Certified CON Level II 
or III 
 senior enlisted, Field-Grade 
officer, GS-11+ 1102 series 
civilians 
 better local operational 
planning 
 some integration 
 more capability for the 
operational commander 
 no planned theater 
integration 
 no broad liaison functions 
 may perform to optimize 
local operations at the 
detriment to theater ops 




 highest level of planning and 
integration—joint 
 linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5 
 creates and executes OPLAN 
CCO strategy 
 provides direction to tier two and 
one 
 links operations strategically to 
theater objectives of COCOM 
 education: Master‘s degree or 
higher and JPME Phase I and II 
 DAWIA Certified CON Level III, 
and other DAWIA disciplines 
(LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) 
 senior officers (O-6+), senior 
civilians, GS-13+ or SES 
 performs operational and 
theater analysis,  integrates 
results into OPLAN 
 link between COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater 
contracting operations 
 coordinates theater 
objectives with best 
approach to contracted 
support 
 can achieve broader national 
security goals through 
effective distribution of 
national assets 
 includes planning, 
communication, 
coordination, and exercising 
with NGO and PVO in 
theater 




This thesis first defined contingency contracting and outlined the four typical 
phases of a contingency operation.  In addition to these four phases, I defined Phase Zero 
operations, a newly added, fifth phase currently being implemented by contingency 
contracting personnel.  The current state of contingency contracting was then described 
using reports from the Gansler Commission and the CWCIA.  In Chapter 2, I presented 
ISAF‘s guidance on COIN contracting and then, in Chapter 3, I described many of the 
ways that USSF employ MAAWS.  Chapter 4 identified many areas of friction (past, 
present, and future) between ISAF‘s guidance and the ways in which USSF employ 
MAAWS.  After identifying these areas of friction, I then provided a number of 
recommendations that can help reduce these areas of friction. 
In order to effectively and efficiently employ MAAWS, USSF units at the SOTF 
level need competent contracting personnel who can advise and assist commanders with 
the integration of contracting into intelligence, plans, and operations.  Incorporating a 
modified version of the Yoder Three-Tier model will accomplish this.  SF Battalions also 
need to add Phase Zero into their traditional four phases on an operation.  Through 
detailed planning and exercises, many of the contracting mechanisms needed during a 
contingency operation can be started prior to deployment and allow USSF units to be 
more pro-active versus reactive. 
 As USSF train for future contingencies, they must become experts on the 
employment of money as a weapons system, especially when it comes to contingency 
contracting.  Two of the SOF Truths are: ―Competent Special Operations Forces cannot 
be created after emergencies occur,‖ and ―Most Special Operations require non-SOF 
assistance.‖66  These two truths also apply to the employment of money as a weapon 
system.  There is no doubt that contingency contracting procedures and personnel will be 
an important part of future contingencies the United States will call on the military to 
handle.  USSF will make up the largest SOF unit called upon to support these 
                                                 
66 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operation Command Fact Book  (2012),  
48.   http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2012.pdf (accessed November 28, 
2011).  
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contingencies as they are the force of choice ―employed throughout the three stages of the 
operational continuum: peacetime, conflict and war.‖67  Just as Special Operators train on 
how to shoot, move, and communicate, they must also train on how to purchase.  This 
training will fully prepare them for future emergencies and enable them to competently 
employ money as a weapon system to support their missions.   
  
                                                 
67 Ibid, 40. 
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